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I. INTRODUCTION

In 2001, we wrote an article discussing the secrecy, disclosure, and fiduciary
duty provisions of the then-emerging new regimes of business organization
law.1 We argued that the Uniform Limited Liability Company Act (ULLCA)
provisions concerning access to and use of firm information were seriously and
facially flawed because the drafters combined provisions governing various
dissimilar business forms without
an adequate underlying theory of the limited
2
liability company (LLC) form.
+ Partner, Faegre & Benson. Mr. Callison was an advisor from the Business Law Section of the
American Bar Association to the Drafting Committee for the Revised Uniform Limited Liability
Company Act.
Dean and Professor of Law, Drake University Law School.
1. J. William Callison & Allan W. Vestal, "They've Created a Lamb with Mandibles of
Death ": Secrecy, Disclosure, and Fiduciary Duties in Limited Liability Firms, 76 IND. L.J. 271
(2001).
2. Id. at 274; see also Larry E. Ribstein, A Critique of the Uniform Limited Liability
Company Act, 25 STETSON L. REV. 311, 387 (1995) (criticizing ULLCA for incorporating "rules
that are inappropriately borrowed from other business forms"). Others also criticized the
fiduciary duty provisions of ULLCA, though some ascribed the weaknesses in the Act to other
causes. See, e.g., Rutheford B. Campbell, Jr., Bumping Along the Bottom: Abandoned Principles
and FailedFiduciaryStandardsin Uniform Partnershipand LLC Statutes, 96 KY. L.J. 163, 18990 (2007-2008) ("A public choice analysis suggests that the misdirection [of the fiduciary duty
provisions of ULLCA, RUPA, and ULPA (2001)] was the result of the fact that managers of
unincorporated business entities as a group were best able to overcome collective action problems
and thus bend the uniform acts to their preferences."); Rutheford B. Campbell, Jr., The "New"
Fiduciary Standards Under the Revised Uniform Limited Liability Company Act: More Bottom
Bumpingfrom NCCUSL, 61 ME. L. REV. 27, 29 (2009) ("The fiduciary standards and the opt-out

Catholic University Law Review

[Vol. 59:183

As an example of the flawed product, we identified the odd result under
ULLCA that members in manager-managed LLCs 3 had broad access to
company information but were not subject to any fiduciary duties constraining
their use of such information. 4 Borrowing from the works of Bill Watterson,
we labeled the unconstrained power of these members the "mandibles of
death." 5
Seeking to devise a theory of secrecy, disclosure, and fiduciary duties, we
identified two competing models for structuring the rights and obligations of
participants in unincorporated business organizations. 6 The first model, which
is more individualistic, was based on party autonomy.8 The second model,
which is more traditional, we termed a community model.8 We concluded that
a third model, which we termed a structural model and which synthesizes the
autonomy and community models, is a more apropriate basis for analyzing
the LLC information rights and use restrictions. At the time, we suggested
revisions to the then-new ULLCA that would have, if adopted, conformed its
information disclosure and use restrictions
to the appropriate structural model,
0
solving the mandibles of death problem.'
ULLCA proved unsuccessful as a uniform act. It was adopted in only nine
jurisdictions, all in the first four years following its promulgation in 1996."
The only major business jurisdiction to adopt ULLCA was Illinois.12 In a
second attempt to bring uniformity to this important area of the law, the
rights in RUPA, ULPA (2001), and ULLCA are badly flawed. The fiduciary duty provisions in
the three acts reflect a pro-management bias that facilitates managers' pecuniary interest in
constructing inefficient transactions with the entity's investors. The default standards themselves,
which are likely to govern most situations, are inefficiently lax and limited." (citations omitted)).
3. In the following discussion, we shall refer to such non-managing members of managermanaged LLCs simply as "non-manager members." While one could, we suppose, talk about a
"non-manager member" in a member-managed LLC-presumably one who, by agreement, had
no meaningful or effective participation in management-the possibility is theoretical enough,
and the continual insertion of"in a manager-managed LLC" is cumbersome enough, that we trust
the reader to know what we intend.
4. Callison & Vestal, supra note 1, at 275-78; see UNIF. LTD. LIAB. Co. ACT §§ 408, 409
(1996), 6B U.L.A. 596-98 (2008) (designating section 408 as "Member's right to information"
and section 409 as "General standards of member's and manager's conduct").
5. Callison & Vestal, supra note 1, at 279 & n.38 (citing BILL WATI'ERSON, THE
AUTHORITATIVE CALVIN AND HOBBES: A CALVIN AND HOBBES TREASURY 116 (1990) ("Yep.
Mandibles of death, that's what he's got." (Calvin to Uncle Max, about Hobbes))).
6. Callison & Vestal, supranote 1,at 294-95, 298.
7. Id.at 294-95.
8. Id.at 298.
9. Id. at 305-06.
10. Id.at 307-09.
11. UNIF. LTD. LIAB. Co. ACT (1996), 6B U.L.A. 545 (2008). ULLCA was adopted by
Hawaii, South Carolina, Vermont, and West Virginia in 1996; by Alabama and Illinois in 1997;
by South Dakota and the Virgin Islands in 1998; and by Montana in 1999. Id. It has not been
adopted by any jurisdiction since. Id.
12. See id.; see also 805 ILL. COMP. STAT. 180/1-1 to /60-1 (2004).
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National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws (NCCUSL)
promulgated a new LLC statute in 2006-the Revised Uniform Limited
Liability Company Act (RULLCA).13 One might ask whether the RULLCA
drafters fixed the mandibles of death problem we pointed out in our 2001
article, and, if they did, whether such a fix was the result of having adopted an

underlying theory of the LLC form.
Part II looks to see if the RULLCA drafters fixed the mandibles of death

problem in ULLCA. Part III provides a more general review of the RULLCA
information disclosure and fiduciary duty sections to see if the drafters adopted
such a theory to guide their efforts.

Finally, Part IV suggests a course for

future business-entity projects in order to avoid the problems of ULLCA.
II. RULLCA AND THE MANDIBLES OF DEATH PROBLEM
The mandibles of death problem in ULLCA arises at the intersection of the
Act's fiduciary duty and information disclosure sections.' 4 Simply put,
ULLCA leaves non-manager members unconstrained by any fiduciary duties
but with sweeping information rights.' 5 The drafters of RULLCA could have
fixed the mandibles of death problem either by imposing fiduciary duties on
such members or by restricting their access to information. Below, we review
the RULLCA fiduciary duty and access-to-information provisions to see if the
mandibles of death problem has been resolved.
What are the duties of non-manager members?

Under ULLCA, the

fiduciary duties of non-manager members are simple: there are none. 16 Nor do
such members appear to owe a duty of good faith and fair dealing under
7
ULLCA.
This absence of fiduciary duties is the source of the mandibles of
death problem.

13. REVISED UNIF. LTD. LIAB. Co. ACT (2006), 6B U.L.A. 407, 543 (2008). As of October
2008, RULLCA has been adopted by two jurisdictions: Idaho and Iowa. Id.; see also 2008 Idaho
Sess. Laws 479-522 (adopting RULLCA); 2008 Iowa Acts 616-73 (adopting RULLCA).
14. See supra notes 3-4 and accompanying text.
15. See UNIF. LTD. LIAB. Co. ACT §§ 408,409 (1996), 6B U.L.A. 596-98 (2008).
16. See id. § 409(h)(1) (1996), 6B U.L.A. 598 ("In a manager-managed company . . . a
member who is not also a manager owes no duties to the company or to the other members solely
by reason of being a member.").
17. See id § 409(d), 6B U.L.A. 598. Section 409(d) states: "A member shall discharge the
duties to a member-managed company and its other members under this [Act] or under the
operating agreement and exercise any right consistently with the obligation of good faith and fair
dealing." Id. The language of section 409(d) can be read in two ways. First, it could be read to
apply in full only to member-managed companies. Second, the language, "[a] member shall ...
exercise any right consistently with the obligation of good faith and fair dealing," can be read to
apply to all members, including members in manager-managed companies. While we originally
accepted the second reading, the placement of the subsection in the middle of six other
subsections that, by their terms, deal only with member-managed companies causes us to
reconsider our previous position. Callison & Vestal, supra note 1, at 276.
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With respect to the fiduciary duties of non-manager members, RULLCA
8
reaches the same result as ULLCA-such members owe no fiduciary duties.'
To the extent ULLCA does not impose an obligation of good faith and fair
dealing on a non-manager member, RULLCA makes a change. RULLCA
clarifies the good-faith and fair-dealing obligation of non-manager members
and clearly makes non-manager members subject to the obligation of good
faith and fair dealing, providing that "[a] member in a . . . manager-managed
limited liability company shall discharge the duties under this [Act] or under
the operating agreement and exercise any rights19 consistently with the
contractual obligation of good faith and fair dealing.-"
Does the existence of an obligation of good faith and fair dealing on nonmanager members answer the mandibles of death problem? As it turns out, the
answer is unclear. The analysis starts with the statutory provisions creating the
obligation: "A member in a member-managed limited liability company or a
manager-managed limited liability company shall discharge the duties under
this [Act] or under the operating agreement and exercise any rights consistently
with the contractual obligation of good faith and fair dealing., 20 Under
RULLCA, as under the Revised Uniform Partnership Act (RUPA) and
ULLCA, 21 the obligation of good faith and fair dealing is not a fiduciary duty,

18. REVISED UNIF. LTD. LIAB. Co. ACT § 409(a), (g) (2006), 6B U.L.A. 488-89 (2008).
The statute provides that members in member-managed LLCs owe fiduciary duties of loyalty and
care. Id. § 409(a), 6B U.L.A. 488. It then provides that in manager-managedLLCs, the fiduciary
duties of loyalty and care apply to managers but not to members. Id. § 409(g)(1), 6B U.L.A. 489
("In a manager-managed limited liability company . . . Subsections (a) [member of membermanaged limited liability company owes the fiduciary duties of loyalty and care], (b) [duty of
loyalty definition], (c) [duty of care definition], and (e) [fairness of transaction as a defense] apply
to the manager or managers and not the members.").
19. Id § 409(d), 6B U.L.A. 489. Indeed, possibly to atone for the confusion on this point in
ULLCA, RULLCA restates the proposition in section 409(g)(3): "[i]n a manager-managed
limited liability company . . . Subsection (d) applies to the members and managers." Id. §
409(g)(3), 6B U.L.A. 489.
20. Id. § 409(d), 6B U.L.A. 489.
21. Compare REVISED UNIF. LTD. LIAB. Co. ACT § 409(d) & cmt. subsection (d), 6B
U.L.A. 489, 491, with UNIF. P'SHIP ACT § 404(d) (1997), 6 pt. I U.L.A. 143 (2001) (popularly
known as the Revised Uniform Partnership Act (RUPA)), and UNIF. LTD. LIAB. Co. ACT §
409(d) (1996), 6B U.L.A. 598 (2008). See also J. William Callison, Blind Men and Elephants:
Fiduciary Duties Under the Revised Uniform Partnership Act, the Uniform Limited Liability
Company Act, and Beyond, I J. SMALL & EMERGING Bus. L. 109, 141-46, 148-53 (1997)
(discussing possible variations on the good-faith obligation). RUPA provides in section 404(d):
"A partner shall discharge the duties to the partnership and the other partners under this [Act] or
under the partnership agreement and exercise any rights consistently with the obligation of good
faith and fair dealing." UNIF. P'SHIP ACT § 404(d), 6 pt. I U.L.A. 143. The RUPA drafters
clearly intended that the obligation of good faith and fair dealing not be a fiduciary or stand-alone
duty:
Subsection (d) is ... new. It provides that partners have an obligation of good faith
and fair dealing in the discharge of all their duties, including those arising under the
Act, such as their fiduciary duties of loyalty and care, and those arising under the
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but rather is a non-fiduciary, non-stand-alone obligation sounding in contract:
"[t]his subsection refers to the 'contractual obligation of good faith and fair
dealing' to emphasize that the obligation is not an invitation to re-write
'
agreements among the members.' ,22
As explained in the comment to section
409 of RULLCA: "[tihe obligation of good faith and fair dealing is not a
fiduciary duty, does not command altruism or self-abnegation,23 and does not
prevent a partner from acting in the partner's own self-interest."
Would it be a violation of the non-fiduciary obligation of good faith and fair
dealing for a non-manager member to use information gained pursuant to the
member's status as a member for his personal benefit and to the detriment of
the limited liability company? Perhaps.
If, as the official commentary provides, "the obligation is not an invitation to
re-write agreements among the members," if the obligation "does not
command altruism or self-abnegation, and does not prevent a partner from
acting in the partner's own self-interest," and if courts do "not use the
obligation to change ex post facto the parties' or this Act's allocation of risk
and power, ' 24 then it would seem difficult to argue that a non-manager
member who uses information to his benefit would be violating the duty of
good faith and fair dealing. If we accept the RULLCA drafters' analogy
between a limited partner in a limited partnership and a non-manager member,
then the official commentary provides that the obligation of good faith and fair
dealing "should be used only to protect agreed-upon arrangements from
conduct that is manifestly beyond what a reasonable person could have
contemplated when the arrangements were made." 25 The RULLCA drafters
26
should have been aware of the mandibles of death problem.
They made a
partnership agreement. The exercise of any rights by a partner is also subject to the
obligation of good faith and fair dealing....
The obligation of good faith and fair dealing is a contract concept, imposed on the
partners because of the consensual nature of a partnership.... It is not characterized,
in RUPA, as a fiduciary duty arising out of the partners' special relationship. Nor is it a
separate and independent obligation. It is an ancillary obligation that applies whenever
a partner discharges a duty or exercises a right under the partnership agreement or the
Act.
Id. § 404 cmt. 4, 6 pt. I U.L.A. 145 (citations omitted). ULLCA similarly provides: "A member
shall discharge the duties to a member-managed company and its other members under this [Act]
or under the operating agreement and exercise any rights consistently with the obligation of good
faith and fair dealing." UNIF. LTD. LIAB. Co. ACT § 409(d) (1996), 6B U.L.A. 598 (2008).
22. REVISED UNIF. LTD. LIAB. CO. ACT § 409 cmt. subsection (d) (2006), 6B U.L.A. 491
(2008).
23. Id (quoting UNIF. LTD. P'SHiP ACT § 305 cmt. subsection (b) (2001), 6A U.L.A. 425
(2008) (popularly known as RUPA)).
24. Id. (quoting UNIF. LTD. P'SHIP ACT § 305 cmt. subsection (b), 6A U. L.A. 425).
25. Id.
26. See Callison & Vestal, supra note 1, at 312 ("There simply is no reason to set a uniform
act in concrete until it is right . . . . ULLCA's information rules are inferior and should be
changed .... "). The Mandibles article was published in 2001, far in advance of the initiation of
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clear policy choice in RULLCA that fiduciary duties do not apply to nonmanager members. 27 It would therefore seem difficult to argue that the use of
LLC information by a non-manager member for the member's benefit and to
the detriment of the LLC constitutes "conduct that is manifestly beyond what a
reasonable
person could have contemplated when the arrangements were
28
made."

The RULLCA drafters opted not to define the obligation of "good faith and
fair dealing," and this partially explains the uncertainty as to whether the selfserving use of company information by a non-manager member could be a
violation of this obligation. In this way, the drafters of RULLCA are
consistent with the drafters of both RUPA and ULLCA.2 9
The "good-faith and fair-dealing" obligation can be conceptualized in a
number of ways. We can start by rejecting the Uniform Commercial Code
(UCC) definition of "good faith," as did the drafters of RUPA. 30 The UCC
defines "good faith" as "honesty in fact and the observance of reasonable
commercial standards of fair dealing." 3' When applied to members of an LLC,
as opposed to merchants in commercial transactions, this definition 32
is, as the
drafters of RUPA likewise concluded, "too narrow or not applicable."
If the UCC definition of good faith as honesty in fact is not adopted, then
how should the term be defined? A number of alternatives have been
suggested to define the obligation of good faith and fair dealing. 33 In all
candor, they do not greatly help resolve the mandibles problem, but rather
seem to suggest that the obligation of good faith and fair dealing does not
the work leading to RULLCA. Nat'l Conference of Comm'rs on Unif. State Laws, Proceedings
in the Committee of the Whole: Uniform Limited Liability Company Act 1 (2003) (statement of
H. Lane Kneedler, Chairperson, Nat'l Conference of Comm'rs on Unif. State Laws) (noting that
the RULLCA Drafting Committee "had its first and only meeting" in the spring of 2003).
27. See supra notes 16, 17 & 20 and accompanying text.
28. REVISED UNIF. LTD. LIAB. Co. ACT § 409 cmt. subsection (d) (2006), 6B U.L.A. 491
(2008) (quoting UNIF. LTD. P'SHIP ACT § 305 cmt. subsection (b) (2001), 6A U.L.A. 425 (2008)).
29. See UNIF. P'SHIP ACT § 404 cmt. 4 (1997), 6 pt. I U.L.A. 145 (2001) ("The meaning of
good faith and fair dealing' is not firmly fixed under present law. 'Good faith' clearly suggests a
subjective element, while 'fair dealing' implies an objective component. It was decided to leave
the terms undefined in the Act and allow the courts to develop their meaning based on the
experience of real cases."); see also UNIF. LTD. LIAB. Co. ACT (1996), 6B U.L.A. 545-652
(2008).
30. See UNIF. P'SHIP ACT § 404 cmt. 4 (1997), 6 pt. I U.L.A. 145 (2001) ("The UCC
definition of 'good faith' is honesty in fact and, in the case of a merchant, the observance of
reasonable commercial standards of fair dealing in the trade. Those definitions were rejected as
too narrow or not applicable." (citation omitted)).
31. U.C.C. § 1-201 (1995).
32. See UNIF. P'SHIP ACT § 404 cmt. 4 (1997), 6 pt. I U.L.A. 145 (2001) ("The UCC
definition of 'good faith' is honesty in fact and, in the case of a merchant, the observance of
reasonable commercial standards of fair dealing in the trade. Those definitions were rejected as
too narrow or not applicable." (citation omitted)).
33. See Callison, supranote 21, at 141-48.
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provide a promising basis upon which to challenge a non-manager member
who uses LLC information for personal benefit and to the company's
detriment. 34
Viewed narrowly, the good-faith and fair-dealing obligation may be seen as
simply a gap filler.35 Here, the question is "whether the parties would have
agreed to prohibit the complained-of action, had they thought to negotiate the
point. ' 36 Under this interpretation, it would be hard to challenge the nonmanager member who used LLC information for personal advantage and to the
detriment of the LLC: RULLCA clearly excludes non-manager members from
owing fiduciary duties and therefore there is no gap to be filled in the nonmanager member's obligations.
Another possible interpretation views the good-faith and fair-dealing
obligation as testing whether the member acted in knowing breach of the
agreement.37 Here, the question is whether the member knows that he is
breaching the agreement. 38 This interpretation does not appear helpful to a
potential plaintiff, because there does not seem to be a breach of the agreement
of which the member would, or would not, be aware.
A third possible interpretation of the good-faith and fair-dealing obligation
would only protect against the non-manager member's actions taken with a
tortious state of mind. 39 Under this interpretation, the question is whether the
party acted in bad faith-with a tortious state of mind-presumably even if the
specific action was permitted under the applicable agreement. 40 This tortious
state of mind requires that "the defendant possessed an intent to harm, or the
defendant's actions constituted reckless and wanton misconduct or willful and
wanton misconduct. ' , 1 This interpretation could be seen to focus on the wrong
question. It would seem an odd result for the question of liability to turn on
whether a non-manager member tortiously intended to benefit himself or harm
the LLC, as opposed to focusing on the result of the non-manager's actions.
A final possibility involves looking beyond the partnership cases to develop
a general understanding of the concept of good faith and fair dealing by
reviewing case law involving closely held corporations.4 2
Given the
34. Id.
35. Id. at 141-43; see Katz v. Oak Indus. Inc., 508 A.2d 873, 880 (Del. Ch. 1986); Larry E.
Ribstein, The Revised Uniform PartnershipAct: Not Ready for Prime Time, 49 Bus. LAW. 45, 55
(1993-1994).
36. Callison, supra note 21, at 145.
37. See, e.g., U.S. Cellular Inv. Co. v. Bell Atd. Mobile Sys., Inc., 677 A.2d 497, 504 (Del.
1996).
38. See id
39. See Desert Equities, Inc. v. Morgan Stanley Leveraged Equity Fund II, L.P., 624 A.2d
1199, 1207-08 (Del. 1993).
40. Id. at 1202, 1207-08.
41. Callison, supra note 21, at 147; see Rose Acre Farms, Inc. v. Cone, 492 N.E.2d 61, 70
(Ind. Ct. App. 1986).
42. Callison, supra note 21, at 148-53.
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similarities between LLCs and close corporations, it is appropriate to consider
how courts address good faith and fair dealing in closely held corporation
cases. The famous trio of Massachusetts cases-Donahue v. Rodd Electrotype
Co.,43 Wilkes v. Springside Nursing Home, Inc.,44 and Smith v. Atlantic
45
Properties,Inc. -suggests a two-part test: when a non-manager member uses
LLC information for his own benefit and to the detriment of the LLC, the nonmanager member bears the initial burden of "demonstrat[ing] a legitimate
business purpose for [his] action. 46 If this burden is satisfied the burden
would shift to the LLC and its other members "to demonstrate that the same
legitimate objective could have been achieved through [a less harmful]
alternative course of action. ' 47 This burden-shifting test, applied in the closely
held corporation context, would help a member of an LLC prevent a fellow
non-manager member from using LLC information for his own benefit and to
the detriment of the LLC by imposing the initial burden on the fellow nonmanager member to establish that he had a business-related purpose for using
the information. This would help avoid a mandibles of death situation.
In all of the discussions of how the obligation of good faith and fair dealing
should be interpreted, one element seems to get less attention than it merits.
NCCUSL made a deliberate choice to fashion the obligation as one of "good
faith and fair dealing" and not simply as an obligation of "good faith. '' 48 It is
generally accepted that "fair dealing" is an objective test and "good faith" is a
subjective test.4 9 It is not clear how a non-manager member's use of LLC
information for his benefit and to the detriment of the LLC would measure up
under an objective fair-dealing test.
Therefore, it is not clear whether the RULLCA drafters solved the mandibles
of death problem by imposing duties on non-manager members to protect the
LLC. If they did not, the question becomes whether they solved it by
restricting the access of such members to company information. As it turns
out, they did indeed. °
One of the most significant changes from ULLCA to RULLCA was a
revision in the information rights of non-manager members.51 ULLCA did not

43. Donahue v. Rodd Electrotype Co., 328 N.E.2d 505 (Mass. 1975).
44. Wilkes v. Springside Nursing Home, Inc., 353 N.E.2d 657 (Mass. 1976).
45. Smith v. AtI. Props., Inc., 422 N.E.2d 798 (Mass. App. Ct. 1981).
46. Wilkes, 353 N.E.2d at 663.
47. Id.
48. Nat'l Conference of Comm'rs on Unif. State Laws, Proceedings in the Committee of the
Whole: Revised Uniform Limited Liability Company Act 120 (2006).
49. UNIF. P'SHIP ACT § 404 cmt. 4 (1997), 6 pt. I U.L.A. 145 (2001).
50. See infra notes 59-66 and accompanying text.
51. Compare UNIF. LTD. LIAB. Co. ACT § 408 (1996), 6B U.L.A. 596 (2008) (failing to
distinguish the information rights in member-managed and manager-managed LLCs), with
REVISED UNIF. LTD. LIAB. Co. ACT § 410 (2006), 6B U.L.A. 492-93 (2008) (differentiating
between member-managed and manager-managed LLCs).
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differentiate the information rights of members in member-managed and
53
52
This was true with respect to records,
manager-managed LLCs.
information required to be furnished absent demand,54 information required to
be furnished on demand,55 and rights to obtain a copy of the operating
agreement. 56 This failure to differentiate between members in membermanaged LLCs (who have fiduciary duties that would presumably limit the
improper use of such information) 5 and non-manager members (who do not
owe fiduciary duties that would limit the improper use of information) created
the mandibles of death problem.58
All of this changed in the evolution from ULLCA to RULLCA. Following
the lead of the Uniform Limited Partnership Act (2001) (ULPA) in
differentiating between general partners and limited partners, 59 RULLCA
differentiates between members in member-managed LLCs and members in
60
manager-managed LLCs by providing separate statutory provisions for each.
Within the member-managed subdivision, in which fiduciary duties constrain
the member's use of information, members have access to records, to a range
52. See UNIF. LTD. LIAB. CO. ACT § 408, 6B U.L.A. 596.
53. Id.§ 408(a), 6B U.L.A. 596 ("A limited liability company shall provide members and
their agents and attorneys access to its records, if any, at the company's principal office or other
reasonable locations specified in the operating agreement. The company shall provide former
members and their agents and attorneys access for proper purposes to records pertaining to the
period during which they were members. The right of access provides the opportunity to inspect
and copy records during ordinary business hours. The company may impose a reasonable charge,
limited to the costs of labor and material, for copies of records furnished.").
54. Id.§ 408(b)(1), 6B U.L.A. 596 ("A limited liability company shall furnish to a member,
and to the legal representative of a deceased member or member under legal disability: (1)
without demand, information concerning the company's business or affairs reasonably required
for the proper exercise of the member's rights and performance of the member's duties under the
operating agreement or this [Act] ....
").
55. Id. § 408(b)(2), 6B U.L.A. 596 ("A limited liability company shall furnish to a member,
and to the legal representative of a deceased member or member under legal disability: . . . (2) on
demand, other information concerning the company's business or affairs, except to the extent the
demand or the information demanded is unreasonable or otherwise improper under the
circumstances.").
56. Id. § 408(c), 6B U.L.A. 596 ("A member has the right upon written demand given to the
limited liability company to obtain at the company's expense a copy of any written operating
agreement.").
57. Id. § 409(a)-(g), 6B U.L.A. 597-98.
58. Id. § 409(h)(1), 6B U.L.A. 598.
59. See Carol R. Goforth, Why Arkansas Should Adopt the Revised Uniform Limited
Liability Company Act, 30 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L. REV.31, 66 (2007).
60. REVISED UNIF. LTD. LIAB. Co. ACT § 410(a), 6B U.L.A. 492-93 (providing rules for
member managed LLCs); id.§ 410(b), 6B U.L.A. 493-94 (providing rules for manager-managed
LLCs).
61. Id. § 410(a)(1), 6B U.L.A. 492-93 ("In a member-managed limited liability company,
the following rules apply: (1)On reasonable notice, a member may inspect and copy during
regular business hours, at a reasonable location specified by the company, any record maintained
by the company regarding the company's activities, financial condition, and other circumstances,
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62
of information without demand,62 and to additional
information on demand. 63
In the manager-managed subdivision in which no fiduciary duties constrain the
use of information by the member, 64 members' rights to information are
sharply restricted. 5 First, the informational rights of members in membermanaged LLCs are specifically denied to members in manager-managed
LLCs. 6 6 Next, the non-manager members' rights to information extend only to
that which "is just and reasonable" and is sought "for a purpose material to the
member's interest as a member," and where "the information sought is directly

connected to the member's purpose. ' 67 In addition, RULLCA provides that an

LLC may, in the ordinary course of its activities, 68impose additional restrictions
and conditions on the availability of information.
to the extent the information is material to the member's rights and duties under the operating
agreement or this [Act] .... ").
62. Id § 410(a)(2)(A), 6B U.L.A. 492-93 ("In a member-managed limited liability
company, the following rules apply: . . . (2) The company shall furnish to each member: (A)
without demand, any information concerning the company's activities, financial condition, and
other circumstances which the company knows and is material to the proper exercise of the
member's rights and duties under the operating agreement or this [Act], except to the extent
the company can establish that it reasonably believes the member already knows the
information ... ").
63. Id. § 410(a)(2)(B), 6B U.L.A. 492-93 ("In a member-managed limited liability
company, the following rules apply: . . . (2) The company shall furnish to each member: ... (B)
on demand, any other information concerning the company's activities, financial condition, and
other circumstances, except to the extent the demand or information demanded is unreasonable or
otherwise improper under the circumstances.").
64. Id. § 409(g), 6B U.L.A. 489.
65. Compare id. § 410(a), 6B U.L.A. 492-93 (providing members in member-managed
LLCs with broad access to information), with id. § 410(b), 6B U.L.A. 493-94 (restricting the
rights to information of members in manager-managed LLCs).
66. Id § 410(b), 6B U.L.A. 493 (stating that in a manager-managed LLC, "[tihe
informational rights stated in subsection (a) and the duty stated in subsection (a)(3) apply to the
managers and not the members").
67. Id. RULLCA clearly delineates the rules relating to the informational rights of members
in manager-managed LLCs, providing that
[i]n a manager-managed limited liability company, the following rules apply: . . . (2)
During regular business hours and at a reasonable location specified by the company, a
member may obtain from the company and inspect and copy full information regarding
the activities, financial condition, and other circumstances of the company as is just and
reasonable if: (A) the member seeks the information for a purpose material to the
member's interest as a member; (B) the member makes a demand in a record received
by the company, describing with reasonable particularity the information sought and
the purpose for seeking the information; and (C) the information sought is directly
connected to the member's purpose.
Id.
68. Id. § 410(g), 6B U.L.A. 494.
In addition to any restriction or condition stated in its operating agreement, a limited
liability company, as a matter within the ordinary course of its activities, may impose
reasonable restrictions and conditions on access to and use of information to be
furnished under this section, including designating information confidential and
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Thus, the drafters of RULLCA solved the mandibles of death problem by
restricting the availability of information to non-manager members and,
possibly, by subjecting the non-manager members to the non-fiduciary
obligations of good faith and fair dealing. This brings us to the larger issue:
did the RULLCA drafters adopt an underlying theory of secrecy, disclosure,
and fiduciary duties?
III. RULLCA AND

A GENERAL THEORY OF SECRECY, DISCLOSURE, AND
FIDUCIARY DUTIES

We have previously suggested that in drafting statutory language for a new
business form it would be helpful to start with a well-articulated theory of how
69
the information rights and use provisions should be structured. Indeed, had
ULLCA been drafted from such a clearly articulated theory, the mandibles of
death problem would have been avoided. We identified three promising
approaches to70 such a theory: party autonomy, communitarianism, and
structuralism.
The party autonomy model we suggested "would conceive of the associating
parties as atomistic contracting agents engaged in individual wealth71
maximizing behavior with constant recalculation of individual advantage."
This model does not require the parties to subordinate immediate individual
advantage in order to realize long-term collective-wealth gains. 72 With respect
to information rights, the party autonomy model would resemble "arm's-length
commercial negotiations." 73 Parties would not be frequently required to
disclose information, and they certainly would be free to elect not to disclose
information when that information is the product of the party's deliberate
effort.74
imposing nondisclosure and safeguarding obligations on the recipient. In a dispute
concerning the reasonableness of a restriction under this subsection, the company has
the burden of proving reasonableness.

Id.
69. Callison & Vestal, supranote 1, at 292.
70. Id.
71. Id. at 294.
72. Id. at 294-95.
73. Id. at 295.
74. In our previous article, we suggested an example of how this might work in a typical
partnership setting:
Partner A would not be required to disclose valuable information to Partner B if the
information were the product of A's efforts to produce the information. For example, if
Partner A expended resources to obtain information concerning oil and gas deposits in
the area surrounding partnership property, he would not be required to disclose such
information to Partner B when negotiating to acquire partnership property or when
negotiating to acquire B's partnership interest. Similarly, Partner A would not be
required to disclose the information to Partner B, and Partner B would not have the
right to demand disclosure, even when the information is significant to the
partnership's business activities.
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The communitarian model we suggested "would conceive of the associating
parties as members of a community who are engaged in individual wealthmaximizing behavior with temporally restricted recalculation of individual
advantage." 75 This model prohibits the instantaneous recalculation of
individual wealth-maximization and requires the parties to "subordinate
immediate [individual] advantage in order to maximize long-term collectivewealth gains." 76 The restrictions on instantaneous recalculation of individual
wealth-maximization are a function of status, not of contract.77 This model
also demands broad disclosure and information rights in contract-based
businesses to prevent partners from personally gaining at the expense of the
collective partnership or co-partner interests.
Such disclosure requirements
would be coupled with robust fiduciary duties. 79 We suggested that this
communitarian model was the traditional basis for the information disclosure
requirements of partnership law under the common law, the Uniform
Partnership Act (UPA), and RUPA, although RUPA adopted a fiduciary duty
formulation different from that called for by the communitarian model. 80
The structuralist model we suggested attempted to avoid both the atomistic
aspects of the party autonomy model and the self-abnegation of the
communitarian model. This pragmatic model combines the party autonomy
model's wealth-maximization concept and communitarianism's recognition of
the social dimensions of the firm.82 The structuralist model provides base-line
default rules rooted in communitarianism, but
which may be modified to meet
83
the particular needs and values of each firm.
Within the structuralist model, the information disclosure provisions are
more nuanced than those under the party autonomy or communitarian
models. 84 The default information-access rules would be directly proportional
Id. at 297 (footnotes omitted). We have acknowledged that the party autonomy model does not
describe the outcome of the broad sweep of partnership cases. Id. at 297 (footnotes omitted).
75. Id. at 298.
76. Id.
77. As we have previously noted:
The community model views the participants not simply as autonomous wealthmaximizing individuals banding together for transitory advantage, but rather as
members of a community pursuing collective goals. In this view, even in the absence
of express contractual provisions mandating individual sharing and sacrifice,
individuals should not be permitted unduly to prefer their interests over the interests of
others. Once the collective identity is realized, it becomes possible to consider the
existence of duties to the collective and to the other members.
Id.
78. Id. at 299.
79. Id.
80. Id.at 299-303.
81. Id. at 305.

82. Id
83. Id.
84. See id. at 305-06.
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to the level of the member's involvement-the more involved a member is in
the firm's operation, the more information he will be entitled to. 85 This aspect
of the structuralist model explains historical levels of fiduciary
duties and
86
information rights among various types of unincorporated firms.
In 2001, we called for a structuralist theory to undergird the law of LLCs
and suggested that future drafting projects for uniform unincorporated business
entity acts should adopt the structuralist approach. 87 We suggested, among
other things, that the application of a structuralist model to LLCs would result
in differences in fiduciary duties and information rights based on differences in
each particular member's participation in the LLC. We also suggested three
different member classifications: members in member-managed LLCs,
member-managers in manager-managed LLCs, and non-manager members in
manager-managed LLCs. 89 Members in member-managed LLCs would have
broad information rights and fiduciary duties, 90 members who are managers in
manager-managed LLCs would also have broad information rights and
fiduciary duties, 91 and non-manager members in manager-managed LLCs
85. As we have mentioned:
[T]he general disclosure rules which operate in the absence of a particular contract
would take into account the other aspects of the parties' legal relationship to one
another and, in doing so, Would recognize that in different circumstances members can
have different participation levels in the business community they create. When there
is greater member participation, such as when ownership and management authority
converge, the law should assume greater information disclosure rights and increased
fiduciary duties. On the other hand, when there is little or no convergence between
ownership and management authority, such as when certain members merely contribute
capital and share only in the firm's reward attributes, the law should assume reduced
information disclosure rights and reduced fiduciary duties.
Callison & Vestal, supra note 1,at 306.
86. See id.
87. Id. at 307-10. In 2001, we focused our discussion of the structuralist model on the
NCCUSL project to draft a successor to the Revised Uniform Limited Partnership Act (RULPA),
known as Re-RULPA. Id. at 309-12.
88. Id.at 307.
89. Id.
90. Id. at 307 ("Members in member-managed LLCs should have the broad information
rights and fiduciary duties of partners in general partnerships. Using RUPA as the standard, such
members would have unrestricted right of access to LLC books and records, the right without
predicate demand to information reasonably required for them to exercise any rights and duties
relating to the LLC, and the right upon reasonable and proper demand to all information
concerning the LLC. As to fiduciary duties under RUPA, such members would have statutory
fiduciary duties of loyalty and care together with a nonfiduciary obligation of good faith and fair
dealing.").
91. Id. at 307-08 ("[M]embers who also are managers in manager-managed LLCs should
have the broad information rights and fiduciary duties of general partners in limited
partnerships.... [Sluch member-managers would have the unrestricted right of access to LLC
books and records, the right without predicate demand to information reasonably required to
exercise their rights and duties relating to the LLC, and the right upon reasonable and proper
demand to all information concerning the LLC. As to fiduciary duties, such member-managers
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92
would have the lowest level of information rights and fiduciary duties.
Against this template, how did the RULLCA drafters do? As mentioned
above, the application of a structuralist model to LLCs would result in
differences in fiduciary duties and information rights based on differences in
the characteristics of a member's participation in the LLC. The model
suggests that members in member-managed LLCs should have broad

information rights and fiduciary duties, using the information rights and
fiduciary duties of partners in general partnerships as a template. 93 RULLCA
matches this scheme exactly:
" The model calls for members in member-managed LLCs to have an
"unrestricted right of access to LLC books and records," 94 and
RULLCA provides such access in section 410(a)(1), so long as "the
information is material to the member's rights and duties under the
operating agreement or this [Act]. 9 5
* The model calls for members in member-managed LLCs to have a
"right without predicate demand to information reasonably required for
them to exercise any rights and duties relating to the LLC, ' ' 96 and
RULLCA provides it in section 410(a)(2)(A), "except to the extent the
company can establish that
it reasonably believes the member already
97
knows the information.

"

The model calls for members in member-managed LLCs to have a
"right upon reasonable and proper demand to all information
concerning the LLC, ' ' 98 and RULLCA provides it in section

would have statutory fiduciary duties of loyalty and care, together with a nonfiduciary obligation
of good faith and fair dealing.").
92. Id. at 308-09. "[N]onmanager members in manager-managed LLCs should have the
narrow and weaker information rights and fiduciary duties of limited partners in limited
partnerships." Id. The rights of such nonmanager members would be limited to the following
upon demand: "true and full information regarding the state of the business and financial
condition of the [LLC]"; "a copy of the [LLC's] federal, state, and local income tax returns for
each year"; and "other information regarding the affairs of the [LLC] as is just and reasonable."
UNIF. LTD. P'SHIP ACT § 1105 (2001), 6A U.L.A. 302 (2008).
This nonmanager-member information right would be substantially narrower than that
for members who participate in LLC management. Instead of access to all books and
records, the member would be given access to only a short list of basic documents.
Instead of receiving some information without a predicate demand, information is
received only following a reasonable demand.
Instead of access to all LLC
information, such members would have access only to limited information. On the
fiduciary duty side... a nonmanager member would have no statutory fiduciary duties.
Callison & Vestal, supra note 1, at 309.
93. Id. at 307.
94. Id
95. REVISED UNIF. LTD. LIAB. CO. ACT § 410(a)(l) (2006), 6B U.L.A. 492-93 (2008).
96. Callison & Vestal, supra note 1, at 307.
97. REVISED UNIF. LTD. LIAB. CO. ACT § 410(a)(2)(A), 6B U.L.A. 493.
98. Callison & Vestal, supra note 1, at 307.
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410(a)(2)(B), "except to the extent the demand or information
demanded is 99unreasonable or otherwise improper under the
circumstances."
* The model calls for members in member-managed LLCs to "have [a]
statutory fiduciary dut[y] of loyalty,"''0 0 and RULLCA provides it in
sections 409(a) and 409(b).' 0 '
* The model calls for members in member-managed LLCs to "have
statutory fiduciary duties of ... care,"' 0 2 and RULLCA provides it in
sections 409(a) and 409(c).'0 3
* The model calls for members in member-managed LLCs to have "a
and fair dealing,"' 0 4 and
nonfiduciary obligation of good faith
10 5
409(d).
section
RULLCA provides it in
As a general matter, the model suggests that member-managers in managermanaged LLCs "should have the broad information rights and fiduciary duties
of general partners in limited partnerships."' 06 RULLCA matches this scheme
exactly:
* The model calls for member-managers in manager-managed LLCs to
books and records, ' 0 7 and
have an "unrestricted right of access to LLC
08
410(b)(1).1
section
in
it
RULLCA provides
* The model calls for member-managers in manager-managed LLCs to
have a "right without predicate demand to information reasonably
required to exercise their rights and duties relating to the LLC,"1°9 and
RULLCA provides it in section 410(b)(1), "except to the extent the
company can establish ''that it reasonably believes the member already
knows the information. 10
"

99.
100.
101.
102.
103.
104.
105.
491.
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.

The model calls for member-managers in manager-managed LLCs to
have a "right upon reasonable and proper demand to all information
concerning the LLC,"'111 and RULLCA provides it in section
410(a)(2)(B), "except to the extent the demand or information

REVISED UNIF. LTD. LIAB. CO. ACT § 410(a)(2)(B), 6B U.L.A. 493.
Callison & Vestal, supra note 1, at 307.
REVISED UNIF. LTD. LIAB. CO. ACT § 409(a)-(b), 6B U.L.A. 488-89.
Callison & Vestal, supra note 1, at 307.
REVISED UNIF. LTD. LIAB. CO. ACT § 409(a), (c), 6B U.L.A. 488-89.
Callison & Vestal, supra note 1, at 307.
REVISED UNIF. LTD. LIAB. CO. ACT § 409(d) & cmt. subsection (d), 6B U.L.A. 489,
Callison & Vestal, supra note 1, at 307.
Id. at 307-08.
REVISED UNIF. LTD. LIAB. Co. ACT § 410(a)(1), (b)(1), 6B U.L.A. 493.
Callison & Vestal, supra note 1, at 307-08.
REVISED UNIF. LTD. LIAB. CO. ACT § 410(a)(2)(A), (b)(1), 6B U.L.A. 493.
Callison & Vestal, supra note 1, at 307-08.
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demanded is 1unreasonable or otherwise improper under the
circumstances." 12
* The model calls for member-managers in manager-managed LLCs to
"have [a] statutory fiduciary dut[y] of loyalty,"'1 3 and RULLCA
provides it in section 409(g)." 4
* The model calls for member-managers in manager-managed LLCs to
"have [a] statutory fiduciary dut[y] .. .of care,"'1 15 and RULLCA
provides it in section 409(g)(1)." 6
* The model calls for member-managers in manager-managed LLCs to
have "a nonfiduciary obligation of good faith and fair dealing," ' 1 7 and
RULLCA provides it in sections 409(d) and 409(g)(3).118
With respect to members who are not managers in manager-managed LLCs,
the model suggests that they should have limited information rights and
fiduciary duties, using the information rights and fiduciary duties of limited
partners in limited partnerships as a template. 1 9 RULLCA partially matches
this scheme:
* The model calls for non-manager members in manager-managed LLCs
to have a "right to inspect and copy basic firm records,' 120 and to have a
right to obtain from the LLC "upon reasonable demand," the following
information: (1) "true and full information regarding the state of the
business and financial condition of the [LLC]"; (2) "a copy of the
[LLC's] federal, state, and local income tax retums for each year"; and
(3) "other information regarding the affairs of the [LLC] as is just and
reasonable."' 121 RULLCA does not track this formulation, but rather
provides non-manager members in manager-managed LLCs the ability
to "obtain from the company and inspect and copy full information
regarding the activities, financial condition, and other circumstances of
the company as is just and reasonable' ' l1 2 provided: (1) "the member
seeks the information
for a purpose material to the member's interest as
a member,"' 123 (2) "the member makes a demand . . . describing with

112. REVISED UNIF. LTD. LIAB. Co. ACT § 410(a)(1), (b)(1), 6B U.L.A. 493; id. §
41 0(a)(2)(B).
113. Callison & Vestal, supra note 1, at 308.
114. REVISED UNIF. LTD. LIAB. Co. ACT § 409(a)-(b), (g)(1)-(2), 6B U.L.A. 488-89.
115. Callison & Vestal, supra note 1, at 307-08.
116. REVISED UNIF. LTD. LIAB. Co. ACT § 409(a), (c), (g)(l), 6B U.L.A. 489.
117. Callison & Vestal, supra note 1, at 307-08.
118. REVISED UNIF. LTD. LIAB. Co. ACT § 409(d), (g)(3) & cmt. subsection (d), 6B U.L.A.
489, 491.
119. Callison & Vestal, supra note 1, at 308.
120. Id.at 308.
121. Id.(quoting UNIF. LTD. P'SHIP ACT § 305(2) (amended 1985), 6A U.L.A. 167 (2008)).
122. REVISED UNIF. LTD. LIAB. Co. ACT § 410(b)(2), 6B U.L.A. 493.
123. Id.§ 410(b)(2)(A), 6B U.L.A. 493.
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reasonable particularity the information sought and the purpose for
seeking the information,"12 4 and (3) "the information sought is directly
connected to the member's purpose., 125 Although the formulation is
not identical to the model, both the model and RULLCA provide that
non-manager members in manager-managed LLCs should have limited
access to private LLC information.
0 The model calls for non-manager members in manager-managed LLCs
to "have no statutory fiduciary duties,"'1 26 and RULLCA provides that a
"member does not have any fiduciary duty to the company or to any
127
other member solely by reason of being a member."
Thus, RULLCA substantially adopts the structuralist model for the fiduciary
duties and information disclosure rights of members and managers in LLCs.
IV. CONCLUSION

In 2001, we suggested that under the structuralist model for LLCs,
"ULLCA's dangerous mismatch between the community model's information
rights regime and the autonomy model's fiduciary duty regime would be
eliminated."' 128 Indeed, the drafters of1 29RULLCA adopted the structuralist
model and tamed the mandibles of death.
In their good work, the RULLCA drafters fixed the mandibles of death
problem and adopted a far more coherent and theoretically grounded regime of
fiduciary duties and disclosure obligations. They also returned the fiduciary
duty formulation to its historic foundation, but that is a story for another time.
Not a bad day's work. Thus, while some writers have cautioned against the
adoption of and use of RULLCA, 130 we disagree. Although we continue to
disagree with some of the bright-line categorizations in RULLCA, such as
those stating that non-manager members in manager-managed LLCs never
have duties of loyalty or care and that the duty of care is limited to gross
negligence, 131 we recognize that RULLCA contains provisions of value. That
said, we differ on the ultimate issue of adoption. Vestal, whose personal
124. Id.§ 410(b)(2)(B), 6B U.L.A. 493.
125. Id.§ 410(b)(2)(C), 6B U.L.A. 493.
126. Callison & Vestal, supra note 1,at 309.
127. REVISED UNIF. LTD. LIAB. Co. ACT § 409(g)(5), 6B U.L.A. 489.
128. Callison & Vestal, supra note 1, at 309.
129. See supra notes 93-127 and accompanying text.
130. See, e.g., Larry E. Ribstein, An Analysis of the Revised Uniform Limited Liability
Company Act, 3 VA. L. & BUS. REV. 35, 39 (2008) ("RULLCA imposes enough risks on limited
liability companies that state legislators should hesitate to adopt it, and lawyers should consider
carefully the pitfalls of advising clients to form LLCs under RULLCA.").
":The Inadequacy
131. J. William Callison, "The Law Does Not Perfectly Comprehend ....
of the Gross Negligence Duty of Care Standardin UnincorporatedBusiness Organizations, 94
KY. L. J. 451, 485 (2005-2006) (critiquing gross negligence duty of care formulation); J. William
Callison & Allan W. Vestal, The Want of a Theory, Again, 37 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 719, 727-33
(2004) (critiquing fiduciary duties and information rights provisions of ULPA (2001)).
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calculus places substantial value on uniformity, concludes that the product is
good enough and would recommend RULLCA's adoption. Callison-though
he supports many of the statutory solutions in RULLCA-is less certain of
wholesale adoption, but he believes that, at a minimum, state legislatures can
look to RULLCA to solve numerous problems, including that of the mandibles
of death.
Where do we go from here? There is no conceptual reason why the
structuralist model animating the fiduciary duty and information disclosure
provisions of RULLCA should not be applied to a new generation of
unincorporated business entity statutes---one for partnerships and limited
liability partnerships, and the other for limited partnerships. Such a path would
bring our uniform statutes back into alignment on this important point.

